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Abstract
Can prices convey information about the fundamental value of an asset? This pa-
per considers this problem in relation to the dynamic properties of the fundamental
(whether it is constant or time-varying) and the structure of information available to
agents. Risk-averse traders receive two potential signals each period: one exogenous
and private and the other, prices, endogenous and public. Prices aggregate private
information but include aggregate noise. Information can accumulate over time both
through endogenous and exogenous signals. With a constant fundamental, the preci-
sion of both private and public cumulative information increases over time but agents
put progressively more weight on the endogenous signals, asymptotically disregarding
private ones. If the fundamental is time-varying, the use of past private signals com-
plicates the role of prices as a source of information, since it introduces endogenous
serial correlation in the price signal and cross-correlation between it and innovations in
the fundamental. A modied version of the Kalman lter can still be used to extract
information from prices and results show that the precision of the endogenous signals
converges to a constant, with both private and public information used at all times.
Key words: uncertainty, information, Bayesian learning, asset prices.
JEL classication: D83, D84, G12, G14.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyse the ability of prices to convey information about the
fundamental value of an asset, in particular in relation to the nature of the fundamental,
whether it is constant or time-varying. To this end, I consider a multi-period model with
di¤use information, where agents receive sequential signals and use them optimally (in a
Bayesian sense) to estimate the fundamental value of an asset. The nature of the funda-
mental and the structure of information available, which is endogenous in the case of prices,
determine the optimal weights on private and public signals. The evolution of such weights
over time is the central element of investigation of this paper.
To explore these issues, I employ a model where risk averse agents invest in a risky
one-period asset: this means that all they need to know to make their investment decision
is the current price and the liquidation value next period, equal to its fundamental value,
while there is no need to forecast future prices. To allow for the accumulation of information
over time, I adopt the modelling strategy proposed in Vives (1995b) and assume that in
each period agents submit their market orders but trade takes place with some probability:
if it does, the asset is liquidated at the end of the period and the market ends; if not, the
following period the same process repeats, and agents can observe the equilibrium prices from
previous periods. The purpose of this assumption is to isolate the analysis from issues related
to expectations about future prices and higher order beliefs: in this setting, the only possible
informational role of prices is to provide information about other agents beliefs about the
fundamental value. The liquidation value, which represents the fundamental value of the
asset, is unknown to agents and only indirectly inferable through signals. Specically, each
period a trader receives a noisy exogenous private signal about the fundamental value, which
remains available at successive times if trade is not realized. Besides this exogenous signal,
agents can also use prices in their inference, as prices summarize the view of other market
participants and thus can in principle convey important information about the fundamental
value. Bayesian theory provides the optimal weights on the available signals.
There are two main contributions in this work. The rst is to show that, with a constant
fundamental, even when information can accumulate through both exogenous private and
endogenous public signals, asymptotically agents use only prices as a source of information.
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This result is not obvious, and it relies on the precision of the cumulative signal from prices
to increase at a faster rate than that from exogenous information. It extends results from
Vives (1995b), where it is shown that prices become asymptotically fully revealing when
information can accumulate through prices only.
The second contribution of this paper is to show how agents can use prices as a source of
information when the fundamental is time-varying. Endogenous correlation structures must
be accounted for, through a modied Kalman lter. Results show that asymptotically agents
use both signals, as the precision of both private and public information remains nite and
converges to a constant. To the best of my knowledge, this is the rs time the informational
role of prices is considered in a framework with a time-varying fundamental.
The dynamic properties of the fundamental have a deep impact on the informational
content of prices. If the fundamental is constant over time, it is optimal for agents to
put increasing weight on the price signal as information accumulates, and in the limit the
private exogenous signal is completely ignored: prices become fully revealing, even in the
presence of aggregate noise. A version of the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox thus reappears
when agents have the possibility to observe sequential signals on the constant fundamental
value. The paradox, though, does not bite here, as prices converge to the fundamental
value as agents progressively switch from private to public information. This result has been
noted before, notably in Vives (1995b), and it relies on the precision of public information to
increase without bounds: here though, contrary to Vives (1995b), also the precision of private
information increases without limit, so it is not obvious that such result would persist. The
reason why it does is that, because of risk averse agents, the precision of public information
grows at a faster rate than that of private information, thus leading to an increasing Bayesian
weight on price signals.
The precision of agents estimates grows without limit because they receive sequential
signals on a constant fundamental: as the number of conditionally independent observations
grows large, the law of large numbers implies that the variance of the estimates decreases
to zero. The same cannot happen when the fundamental is changing over time, and issues
arise on the ability of prices to aggregate private signals and convey information about the
changing fundamental. To investigate if prices can still reveal information in this case, I
assume the fundamental follows a random walk process. As prices aggregate current and
past information used in the estimation of the fundamental, prices now include the whole
history of innovations in the random walk, and thus show both serial correlation and cross
correlation with the fundamental. The use of prices as signals becomes thus problematic as
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the endogenous and time-varying correlation structures need to be accounted for. I show
how this can be done in the context of a Kalman lter, and what the implications are for
the informativeness of prices. The endogenous correlations depend on the sequence of past
Kalman gains, and in turn determine the current gain: this recursion leads to gains (and
thus weights on the two signals) that converge to a constant. Moreover, while the length
of the serial and cross correlations in the price signals increases with time, their conditional
variance converges to a constant. In equilibrium thus agents receive two signals on the
current value of the fundamental, one exogenous and one endogenous, both with constant
and nite precision, which lead to a constant variance in the Kalman estimates.
1.1 Related literature
The problems of information aggregation through prices and of the informational e¢ciency
of markets in the presence of heterogeneous information has been widely considered in the
literature. In seminal works, Grossman (1976) and Grossman (1978) show how prices can
aggregate information perfectly and substitute for private information in markets. This
result raises the possibility of an interesting paradox, as pointed out famously by Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980): if prices aggregate private information perfectly, no trader would have
any incentive to acquire such information, as they could simply look at prices, but then
there would be no information for prices to aggregate. A common approach to get past
this paradox is to include aggregate noise in prices, as in, for example, Hellwig (1980) and
Diamond and Verrecchia (1981). The inclusion of aggregate noise solves the paradox, as
prices are only partially revealing in equilibrium and thus agents have an incentive to acquire
private information.
Another way to resolve the paradox is to consider markets with a nite number of traders
who have market power, as for example in Kyle (1989) and Jackson (1991): market power
ensures that prices only partially reveal private information, thus maintaining an incentive
for agents to acquire such information. A further way out of the paradox, recently pro-
posed by Vives (2014), is to distinguish between common and private value components
in the valuations of traders, with signals only providing bundled information about these
components.
All these works consider static settings, where information is only received once. Noisy
rational expectations equilibria, though, have also been analyzed in dynamic settings. Vives
(1993) studies the rate at which dispersed information is incorporated into prices with risk
neutral rms. Convergence is slow with nite precision of private information but a positive
3
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mass of perfectly informed agents speeds up convergence. Vives (1995b) studies the rate
at which dispersed private information about the value of a risky asset is incorporated into
prices with risk averse agents: the speed of information revelation is found to depend crucially
on the presence of a competitive risk neutral market making sector. Vives (1995a) considers
instead the e¤ect of investors horizons on the informational content of prices in a nite-
horizon model with risk averse agents. The e¤ect depends on the temporal pattern of private
information arrival: long horizons reduce the nal price informativeness when the arrival of
information is di¤use (as in the present paper); nevertheless, as the number of trading periods
increases without bound, prices converge to the fundamental value. Kyle (1985) analyses how
quickly new private information about the underlying value of a speculative commodity gets
incorporated into market prices and how it a¤ects the liquidity of the market. The model has
three kinds of traders: a single risk neutral insider, random noise traders, and competitive
risk neutral market makers. The insider makes positive prots by exploiting his monopoly
power, with noise trading concealing his trading from market makers. In the limit, as the
time interval between auctions goes to zero, all private information is incorporated into prices
through trading. Amador andWeill (2012) consider a dynamic framework where agents learn
from the actions of others through two channels: a public channel, such as equilibriummarket
prices, and a private channel, such as local interactions: when agents learn only from the
public channel, an initial release of public information increases knowledge and welfare, while
if a private learning channel is also present, the result is reversed and an increase in initial
public information reduces agents asymptotic knowledge. Importantly, while the initial
signals realizations are centered around the true state of the world, subsequent realizations
are centered around the endogenous actions of agents: that is, after the rst period, all new
information about the state of the world comes from others and there is no additional arrival
of new exogenous information. This possibility is instead crucial for results I will present in
this paper.
Di¤erently from all these works, I do not focus on the speed of information revelation,
the structure of the market, the informational type of traders or their investment horizon.
The focus of the paper is instead on the relation between the dynamic properties of the
fundamental, the structure of the endogenous signal and the informational content of prices.
An important issue that is not addressed in this paper is the role of higher order beliefs
on prices under heterogeneous information and how they interact with sequential signals.
To avoid dealing with the interaction between higher order beliefs and the accumulation of
information on fundamentals, I limit the setting to a one-period asset, so that agents do
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not need to forecast future prices and only use prices as a signal for other agents beliefs
about the fundamental. Seminal papers on the problem of higher order beliefs are Townsend
(1983) and Sargent (1991), and more recent treatments are proposed in Allen, Morris and
Shin (2006), Kasa et al. (2014) and Nimark (2017).
2 The model
I assume there is a risky one-period asset available for trade on the market. Traders submit
their demand schedules based on the information they have and an auctioneer aggregates
all orders and determines the equilibrium price. Trade then takes place with some given
probability: if it does, then the asset is liquidated at the end of the period at the value t
and the market ends; if not, the following period the same process repeats. The liquidation
value t thus represents the fundamental value of the asset for traders.
The market is populated by a continuum of agents of unit mass, indexed by i 2 [0; 1],
homogeneous in all aspects except for the private information they receive, which will be
specied below. In deciding their demand of shares, agents are mean variance maximizers, so
they maximize the expected return of their investment subject to a penalty for the variance.1
The problem for a trader i at time t is thus to choose the number of shares (sit) such that
max
sit
EitR
i
t  

2
V arit
 
Rit

(1)
where  is the coe¢cient of risk aversion and the return on the portfolio of agent i at time t,
Rit, is dened as the di¤erence between its liquidation value and what one has to pay for it
2
Rit = s
i
t (t   pt) :
The expectational operator Eit represents the conditional expectations of agent i at time t
given their information set I it : E
i
tX = E [X j I
i
t ].
1Basak and Chabakauri (2010) show that dynamic mean-variance portfolio choices are not dynamically
consistent. While this is an important issue, mean-variance behavior is still commonly assumed as it leads
to analytically tractable demand functions. In the present setting, as agents e¤ectively solve a series of
one-period problems, this issue does not arise.
2One could equivalently assume risk averse agents with CARA utility
U
 
Rit

=   exp
 
 Rit

:
Maximizing the expected value of U(Rit) is equivalent to maximizing (1), the certainty equivalent, assuming
a CARA utility function and normal random returns.
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It follows that the optimal demand for trader i is
sit =
Eitt   pt
2
^t
; (2)
where 2
^t
is the conditional variance of the prediction error associated to Eitt.
3
In order to close the model with an equilibrium condition, I assume that the supply of
shares "t is an i.i.d. random variable following a Normal distribution with zero mean and
variance 2". An exogenous and stochastic supply is often interpreted in the literature as com-
ing from noise traders. Other interpretations of this aggregate noise term refer to variations
in the availability of publicly tradable shares (asset oat), as in Branch and Evans (2011),
or to some unspecied random supply, as in Mele and Sangiorgi (2015). Independently of
its interpretation, this aggregate noise term can prevent prices from being fully revealing, a
common result in the literature on noisy rational expectations equilibria. Indeed, adopting
the same assumption, Allen, Morris and Shin (2006), after providing an interpretation for
such modelling choice, write: "Clearly, the interpretation given above is somewhat contrived,
but we advance it merely as a modeling device that serves the purpose of preventing prices
being fully revealing, and preserving the independence of the supply shocks over time, so as
to aid tractability of the analysis." The same motivation for such modelling choice applies
here.
Traders thus submit their individual demands and an auctioneer clears the market given
the exogenous supply. Market equilibrium thus requiresZ
sitdi = "t
which implies and equilibrium price
pt =
Z
Eittdi  
2
^t
"t: (3)
With no uncertainty, Eitt = t 8i, and 
2
^t
= 0 and thus prices would be constant at the
fundamental value, i.e., pt = t.
I now dene the exogenous process for the fundamental and the source of uncertainty for
agents. At the beginning of time t = 1, Nature draws the unobservable fundamental from an
3Such conditional variance is common across agents, given the informational assumptions made. In par-
ticular, while agents receive heterogeneous private information, the precision of such information is common
across agents.
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improper uniform distribution over R.4 Before receiving any information, thus, agents have
a at uninformative prior on 1. From time t = 2 onwards the fundamental then follows a
random walk process
t = t 1 + zt 1 (4)
with zt an i.i.d. random variable following a Normal distribution with zero mean and constant
variance 2z.
At each time t  1, each agent observes a private signal on t, x
i
t, given by
xit = t + v
i
t; (5)
with vit an i.i.d. random variable, following a Normal distribution with zero mean and
variance 2v: Importantly, zt and v
i
t are uncorrelated with each other: that is, the change in
the fundamental and the noise in the observations are independent. Agents can also observe
past prices (but not current ones), and inherit their own information from time t   1. The
assumption that agents cannot condition their beliefs on current equilibrium prices has been
used before in the literature with dynamic settings, see for example Vives (1995b). Such
an assumption might seem odd here, as agents condition their demand schedules on prices
but not their beliefs, but it simplies greatly the derivation of the equilibrium, as it avoids
having to compute per-period xed points between correlation structures and gains in the
recursive Kalman lter used later on.
Denoting I it the information set for agent i at time t, for t > 1 one can dene recursively
I it = I
i
t 1 +

xit; pt 1
	
;
with I i1 = fx
i
1g, and p
t 1 = (p1; :::; pt 1), x
i;t = (xi1; :::; x
i
t). The assumption about the
availability of past private signals di¤erentiates the information structure assumed here from
the one in Vives (1995b), where each period agents can only observe the current exogenous
signal, forgetting all the previous ones.
3 Constant fundamental
I rst consider the special case of a constant fundamental over time, obtained by setting
2z = 0. Nature thus draws the fundamental  at the beginning of time t = 1, from an
4Note that the fundamental can be negative, and so do prices. Such feature can be justied by assuming
that there is no free disposal of the risky asset. This simplies the set up, as it avoids having a truncation
in the support of agents beliefs.
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improper uniform distribution over the real line R, and the fundamental remains the same
until the time that trade takes place and the market ends.
At every period t  1, the exogenous private signals that agents receive is thus given by
xit =  + v
i
t: (6)
Agents behave as Bayesian learners and use all available information in an optimal way.
First, looking at private information only, mean and precision of the posterior of  at each
time t, conditional on the history of xit, can be written, respectively, as
xit =
t 1
t
xit 1 +
 2v
t
xit =
1
t
tX
n=1
xin (7)
t = t 1 + 
 2
v =
tX
n=1
 2v =
t
2v
; (8)
with 0 = 0 and x
i
0 = 0 (that is, x
i
1 = x
i
1; 1 = 
 2
v , given that agents can rely only on the
exogenous signal in the rst period). Note that (7) is simply the sample mean, and (8) the
inverse of the sample variance. In fact, (7) in its recursive form can be rewritten more easily
as
xit =
t  1
t
xit 1 +
1
t
xit;
a weighted average of the prior and new information received at time t. The posterior xit, or
sample mean, can be regarded as a cumulative signal from exogenous private information,
as it is a su¢cient statistics for the whole history fxing
t
n=1.
In terms of the public endogenous signal represented by prices, its informational content
depends on how agents form their beliefs. If, for example, agents where to use only xit to
form their expectations, then prices would take the form
pt =    
 1
t "t (9)
and agents would want to use past prices as signals to improve on the precision of their beliefs.
Such practice though would introduce serial correlation in prices (through the exogenous
aggregate noise) rendering the very same practice invalid.
In order to nd the equilibrium in the use of information, one thus has to construct a signal
based on prices that, when used by agents, validates such practice. To such end, I dene a
signal ~pt (with conditional variance 
2
~pt ), based on prices, which represents an unbiased signal
8
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for , with serially uncorrelated noise "t: that is, ~pt has the same informational structure
as xit. The existence of such signal will be veried below. The mean and precision of the
posterior of  at time t, conditional on the history of ~pt, are then given, respectively, by
pt =
!t 1
!t
pt 1 +
 2~pt
!t
~pt =
Pt
n=1 
 2
~pn
~pzPt
n=1 
 2
~pn
(10)
!t = !t 1 + 
 2
~pt
=
tX
n=1
 2~pn ; (11)
with !0 = 0 and p0 = 0 (that is, p1 = p1). The posterior pt represents the optimal estimate
for  based on the history of prices, with each signal weighted by its relative precision. It
can thus be regarded as a cumulative signal from endogenous public information, as it is a
su¢cient statistics for the whole history fpng
t
n=1.
The optimal estimate based on all information available at time t, that is E [ j xi;t; pt 1] ;
can then be written as the combination of the two cumulative signals available, weighted by
their relative precision.5 Denoting such estimate ^
i
t:
^
i
t = E

 j xi;t; pt 1

= tx
i
t + (1  t) pt 1; (12)
with t determined by the relative precision of the two posteriors, and given by
t =
t
t + !t 1
: (13)
Using the demand equation
sit =
^
i
t   pt
2
^t
(14)
with
2
^t
= 2t
 1
t + (1  t)
2 ! 1t 1 =
1
t + !t 1
; (15)
aggregating and imposing demand equal supply, leads to
pt = (t + (1  t) pt 1)  
2
^t
"t: (16)
5This will not be true for the case with a time-varying fundamental, where individual signals need to be
merged together through a Kalman lter procedure.
The formulation used here, with separate cumulative signals, has the advantage of allowing one to see the
evolution of the precision of public and private information separately, and how this a¤ects relative weights.
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Solving for pt, using (10), (11) and (13), gives the price equation
pt =
t
t + !t 1
 +
!t 1
t + !t 1
pt 1  
"t
t + !t 1
: (17)
Prices thus contain current and past aggregate noise, through pt 1, and do not represent
conditionally independent signals for the fundamental.
One can then dene
~pt 
pt   (1  t) pt 1
t
=     1t 
2
^t
"t (18)
=

pt  
!t 1
t + !t 1
pt 1

t + !t 1
t

=     1t "t;
with conditional variance
2~pt = 
 2
t 
22": (19)
This validates the assumption on ~pt made above: an unbiased signal for the fundamental
based on prices, with independent (but not identically distributed) noise over time.
The question now is what happens over time to the weights on exogenous and endogenous
information. Do agents keep using both sources of information over time, or do they discard
one in favour of the other?
Looking at the asymptotic dynamics of the system, it can be shown that the relative
weight put on private information decreases towards zero and asymptotically agents rely
only on prices in their signal extraction problem. I state this result formally in the following
Proposition, whose proof can be found in Appendix (6.1).
Proposition 1 In the setting presented in Section (3), where the optimal Bayesian weight
on private information is given by (13) and prices evolve according to (16), in the limit, t
converges to 0: asymptotically, agents put zero weight on private information. Moreover, pt
converges in probability to the fundamental value .
To understand these results it must be noted that while both t and !t tend to 1 as
t!1, t grows linearly in t while !t grows at a faster rate (of the order of t
3): both private
and public information become innitely precise in the limit, but the precision of the public
cumulative signal improves faster and agents end up relying only on price signals to infer
fundamental values.
The reason why the precision of endogenous information grows at a faster rate than that
of the exogenous one is that agents are risk averse and therefore their demand schedules,
10
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and thus prices, depend on the precision of their estimate for the fundamental. The higher
is the precision, the more prices respond to information and thus incorporate information
themselves. As prices depend linearly on the variance of agents estimates, their variance
depends on it quadratically: this will be shown precisely in the next Section in the context of
a static setting. With information accumulation, then, an extra dimension is added, and this
explains why, while the precision of private information increases linearly in t, the precision
of public information grows proportional to t3.
Over time, the variance of agents beliefs goes to zero: accumulated information reduces
uncertainty. In the limit, prices converge in probability to the fundamental value, a result
consistent with Vives (1993) and Vives (1995a). At the same time, prices become the only
source of information for agents.
In a sense, the famous Grossman and Stiglitz paradox is reproposed: prices become fully
revealing, so agents dont have any incentive to acquire the private information that should be
aggregated into prices. Here, though, this is a limiting result: prices become fully revealing
once all information has been factored into them and they have converged to the fundamental
value, at which point there is no need to acquire additional exogenous information. This
result, thus, shows a way in which prices can be fully revealing and incorporating private
information.
The fact that prices can become fully revealing when information accumulates was shown
in Vives (1995b). In that work, though, it was assumed that information was accumulating
only through the public signal, as agents could only observe the current value of the exogenous
private signal. It was thus not surprising that agents would put progressively more weight on
prices, as the public signal was becoming more and more precise. Here instead information
accumulates both through public and private signals, so the result is less obvious. The
di¤erence in the rate at which information accumulates through public and private signals
determines the asymptotic use of information.
3.1 The role of risk aversion: a static setting
In light of the above results, it is instructive to look at the simplied framework represented
by a static setting. While results presented here are not new, they help understand the
relationship between risk aversion and the relative precision of endogenous versus exogenous
information that plays out in the multi-period setting.
In a static setting, past prices do not exist. In order for prices to have an informational
role, I thus assume that agents condition their beliefs on the equilibrium price that results
11
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from the auctioneer clearing process. The use of contemporaneous equilibrium prices as
a source of information is common in the literature when analysing static noisy rational
expectations equilibria (see, e.g., Hellwig (1980)).
For simplicity, I drop the subscript t from all variables in this Section. Before the market
opens, Nature draws the fundamental value  from an improper uniform distribution over
the real line R. Agents are aware of this, and thus have a at uninformative prior for the
fundamental before receiving any information. Such feature simplies the Bayesian updating
and it is shown in Appendix (6.2) to be innocuous for the results in the paper.
Traders then receive an exogenous and private signal
xi =  + vi;
with vi Normally distributed and i.i.d. across agents, with zero mean and variance 2v, which
they combine with prices in order to decide their demand schedule. Such demands are then
aggregated by the market and the actual price revealed.
With normally distributed and conditionally independent signals, and restricting atten-
tion to linear equilibria, Bayesian updating gives a posterior ^
i
 E [ j xi; p] that is linear
in the two signals and equal to
^
i
= xi + (1  ) p; (20)
where the optimal value for  is given by the relative precision of the two signals (see
Appendix (6.3) for details) and thus
 =
2p
2p + 
2
v
; (21)
with 2p denoting the conditional variance of prices. For 
2
p; 
2
v > 0,  2 (0; 1) and it is thus
optimal for agents to put some weight on prices, together with the exogenous signal, when
forming beliefs about fundamental values.
Individual demand is then given by
si =
 (xi   p)
2
^
; (22)
where 2
^
, the variance of agents beliefs conditional on xi and p, is common for all agents
and given by
2
^
= 22v + (1  )
2 2p: (23)
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Aggregate demand is then given by
S 
Z
 (xi   p)
2
^
di =
 (   p)
2
^
and prices are equal to
p =   
2
^

"; (24)
which implies
2p =
 
2
^

!2
2": (25)
Using (21) together with (23) and (24) I then derive the equilibrium price equation (see
Appendix (6.4) for details)6
p =    2v"; (26)
which then determines the variance of prices as function only of the exogenous parameters
2p = 
2
 
2v
2
2": (27)
Equilibrium prices are thus normally distributed and conditionally independent from the
private signals, as assumed before. It can also be seen from (27) that the precision of public
information increases with the precision of private information.
An important element in the determination of the equilibrium value of  is the aggregation
of the noise in the private signal. If the exogenous signal was instead common to all agents,
say x, x =  + v, v  N (0; 2v), (21) would become
 =
Ep2   Epx
Ep2 + Ex2   2Epx
=
2p   
2
v
2p + 
2
v   2
2
v
= 1: (28)
Because the noise in the exogenous public signal would be transferred into prices, prices
would be completely useless as a signal for the fundamental value, as they would encompass
both the noise from the exogenous signal and the noise from supply: the optimal value for
6Note that using (17), with !0 = 0 and p0 = 0, at time t = 1, p1 reduces to (26). While the price is the
same, here the precision of agents beliefs is higher than in that case at t = 1, when it was 21 = 
 2
v , since
they can here use current equilibrium prices in their inference. It is in fact straightforward to show that now
2
^
= 2v
22v
2
"
1 + 22v
2
"
< 2v:
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 would thus be equal to one. In other words, in order for prices to have any informational
content above and beyond what is provided by the idiosyncratic signal, it must be that the
aggregation process that generates prices averages out some noise.
With private and idiosyncratic signals, instead, the optimal weight on private information
in terms of the parameters of the model is
 =
2p
2p + 
2
v
=
2 (2v)
2
2"
2v + 
2 (2v)
2 2"
=
22v
2
"
1 + 22v
2
"
; (29)
which shows that the optimal weight on private information depends positively on the coef-
cient of risk aversion, the variance of the noise in the private information and the variance
of the supply.
It is instructive to compute now some limiting cases:
lim
2"!0
 = 0; lim
2"!1
 = 1
lim
2v!0
 = 0; lim
2v!1
 = 1:
If the variance of the aggregate noise goes to zero, then prices become fully revealing
and in equilibrium only prices are used to infer the fundamental value. This result is a
version of the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox. If instead the variance of the aggregate noise goes
to innity, then only the exogenous signal is used as prices lose all informational content
regarding fundamental values.
Furthermore, if the variance of the idiosyncratic noise in the exogenous signal goes to
zero,  goes to zero, as can be easily seen from (29): in equilibrium, no weight is put on
the private signal and only prices are used. This might seem at rst counter-intuitive, and
looking at (21) one might actually mistakenly think that ! 1 as 2v ! 0. The reason why
this does not happen is that as 2v ! 0, the variance of prices goes to zero faster than that
of the private signal.7 This is due to the fact that the volatility of prices originates from the
volatility of supply and from the volatility of demand (multiplicatively): the latter arises,
because of risk averse agents, from uncertainty about the fundamental and in particular is
quadratic in the variance of the private signal.
The same mechanism is at play in the multi-period setting, except that information
accumulates over time, so the precision of the cumulative endogenous signal increases both
through the increased precision of the cumulative private signal and through accumulation
7The variance of prices is in fact quadratic in 2v: see (27).
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in itself. The precision of public information would increase even with constant precision of
the private signal (as in Vives (1995b)) and in that case it would increase linearly in t. Here
instead it increases thorough both channels (as it can be seen clearly through (62)) and thus
at the faster rate of t3.
It is also interesting to consider the condition under which agents put more weight on
their private information than on prices, i.e.,  > 1  , which requires 22v
2
" > 1. When
2v
2
" is small, thus, agents pay little attention to their private signal: this happens when
either the variance of the supply is low (and thus aggregate noise is low and prices are more
informative), or when private information is very precise (because, as explained above, this
enhances the informativeness of prices). An important feature of the Bayesian equilibrium
is that  is not a free parameter but depends instead on the deep structure of the model, as
shown by (29).
The limiting results on the optimal use of information just discussed have implications
also for traders demand. In fact, rewriting (22) as
si = a
 
xi   p

;
with a = 
2
^
= (2v)
 1
, it can be seen that 2v ! 0 implies s
i !1: as private information
becomes innitely precise, the demands response to deviations of prices from the (increas-
ingly precise) signal grows without bounds. In the limit, the only equilibrium possible is one
where prices are equal to the fundamental value.
Note instead that as 2" ! 0; prices become innitely precise through the aggregation
of private information but individual demands do not depend on the volatility of supply:
agents demand the same quantity, irrespective of 2". As the volatility of supply decreases
towards zero, in fact, ! 0, which makes agents respond less and less to deviations of their
private signal from prices; at the same time, though, the conditional variance of the return
on the asset also decreases, which increases the demand of risk averse agents, with the result
that the amount demanded is constant with respect to 2".
4 Time-varying fundamental
Results derived in the multi-period setting with 2z = 0 follow from the accumulation of
information, as conditionally independent signals on a constant fundamental are received
sequentially over time. A crucial element for this result is the fact that the fundamental is
constant over time. If the fundamental was instead time-varying, agents would need discount
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past information more heavily, which would a¤ect the precision of their estimates over time
and the informational content of prices. To investigate these issues I now consider the general
case with 2z > 0, so the fundamental changes over time, following a random walk process.
The ensuing system gives rise to a state-space model where (4) represents the state
equation and (5) an observation equation. Given such state-space system, the optimal way
to track the evolution of t for agents, if there was no other information available, would be
through the use of a Kalman lter on the series fxijg
t
j=1, which is known to minimize the
mean square error of the estimated unknown state when all noise is Gaussian and the model
is linear as in this case. In terms of notation, xit represents the estimate of the fundamental at
time t based on the Kalman lter on exogenous information only;  1t is the variance of the
error of such estimate; and kxt is the Kalman gain, which governs the way new information
is factored into the estimates of the fundamental over time.
The Kalman lter (see, e.g., Elliott, Aggoun and Moore (1995)) recursions to compute
posterior mean and variance of the fundamental based on exogenous information only are
given by
xit = x
i
t 1 + k
x
t
 
xit   x
i
t 1

(30)
 1t = (1  k
x
t )
 
 1t 1 + 
2
z

=
2v
 
 1t 1 + 
2
z

 1t 1 + 
2
z + 
2
v
(31)
kxt =
 1t 1 + 
2
z
 1t 1 + 
2
z + 
2
v
; (32)
with xi0 = 0 and 0 = 0 (that is, x
i
1 = x
i
1, because of a at prior). It is straightforward to
show that (30)-(31) reduce to (7)-(8), with kxt = t
 1, if 2z = 0.
8
The Kalman lter estimate can also be rewritten in a non-recursive way, which highlights
the relationship between gains and weights, as
xit =
tX
j=1
htjx
i
j
8With 2z = 0, the fundamental is constant, so there is no need to track changes and thus kt = t
 1;
with 2v = 0, instead, the fundamental is perfectly observable and there is no need to lter out the noise, so
kt = 1.
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with
htt = k
x
t (33)
htj = k
x
j
tY
n=j+1
(1  kxn) ; for 1  j < t; (34)
where kxj is the Kalman gain given by (32). It can be shown that
Pt
j=1 h
t
j = 1.
9
If one assumes that agents use only exogenous private information, then
^
i
t  E

t j x
t;i

= xit: (35)
Substituting into the price equation, with 2
^t
=  1t , one obtains
pt =
Z
^
i
tdi  
2
^t
"t; (36)
with conditional variance
2p;t = 
2

2
^t
2
2":
In order to understand the informational content of the Kalman estimate, ^
i
t, and thus
of prices, one can solve recursively from (30):
^
i
t = ktt +
t 1X
n=1
"
t 1Y
j=n
(1  kj+1)
#
knn + ktv
i
t + ::: (37)
:::+
t 1X
n=1
"
t 1Y
j=n
(1  kj+1)
#
knv
i
n: (38)
Integrating then over agents and using equation (36) for prices
pt = ktt +
t 1X
n=1
"
t 1Y
j=n
(1  kj+1)
#
knn   
2
^t
"t (39)
= t  
t 1X
j=1
zj
 
jX
n=1
htn
!
  2
^t
"t: (40)
This equation shows how the noise in prices displays both serial correlation and cross cor-
9The estimate xit can equivalently be obtained by using generalized least squares on the data

xij
	t
j=1
,
with each xij representing a signal for t.
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relation with the process noise. Still, this does not preclude to use prices as an additional
source of information. Their very use, though, alters the prediction for the fundamental,
and thus prices themselves. In particular, current prices would also include past aggregate
supply shocks, another source of serial correlation. As before, en equilibrium in the use of
information must be found.
To see this point, assume in equilibrium a signal ~pt from prices can be derived, in the
form
~pt = t +
t 1X
j=1
tjzj +
tX
j=1
 tj"j: (41)
Writing yit = [x
i
t ~pt 1]
0
, with
~pt 1 = t   zt 1 +
t 2X
j=1
t 1j zj +
t 1X
j=1
 t 1j "j;
the Kalman lter estimate for the fundamental could then be represented as
^
i
t =
tX
j=1
qtjy
i
j:
Here qtj is a 1x2 vector, to be determined, which gives the relative weight on the two signals,
exogenous and endogenous, and depends on current and past Kalman gains. Then prices
would be given by
pt =
Z
i
^
i
tdi  
2
^t
"t
=
Z
i
tX
j=1
qtjy
i
jdi  
2
^t
"t
=
tX
j=1
qtj;1j +
t 1X
j=1
qtj;2~pj   
2
^t
"t
=
tX
j=1
qtj;1t  
t 1X
j=1
zj
jX
n=1
qtn;1 +
t 1X
j=1
qtj;2~pj   
2
^t
"t:
Prices would thus include the hole history of fundamental innovations zj,
10 and of exogenous
supply shocks "j (through ~pj). One, though, can remove the seral correlations due to past
10These would enter both through the exogenous signals xij and the endogenous ones p
i
j .
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price signals by dening ~pt as follows
~pt 
pt  
Pt 1
j=1 q
t
j;2~pjPt
j=1 q
t
j;1
= t  
Pt 1
j=1  
t
jzjPt
j=1 q
t
j;1
 
2
^t
"tPt
j=1 q
t
j;1
(42)
with
 tj =
jX
n=1
qtn;1:
The signal ~pt has thus the form (41), but with all the 
t
j = 0 except for 
t
t. In order to
nd the explicit representation of all coe¢cients in ~pt, one needs to write the Kalman lter
parameters qtj in terms of variances and covariances of state and signals.
As agents cannot observe contemporaneous prices when forming beliefs about the funda-
mental, their endogenous time t signal for t is represented by ~pt 1, which can be rewritten
as
~pt 1 = t 1  
Pt 2
j=1  
t 1
j zjPt 1
j=1 q
t 1
j;1
 
2
^t 1
"tPt 1
j=1 q
t 1
j;1
= t   zt 1  
Pt 2
j=1  
t 1
j zjPt 1
j=1 q
t 1
j;1
 
2
^t 1
"t 1Pt 1
j=1 q
t 1
j;1
= t  
Pt 1
j=1  
t 1
j zjPt 1
j=1 q
t 1
j;1
 
2
^t 1
"t 1Pt 1
j=1 q
t 1
j;1
; (43)
with  t 1t 1 =
Pt 1
j=1 q
t 1
j;1 , which implies that the coe¢cient in ~pt 1 on zt 1 is  1.
What (42) shows is that it is possible for agents, using only known quantities (past price
signals and Kalman gains), to remove the serial correlation in prices that comes from using
endogenous signals in the Kalman lter recursion. It is not possible instead to remove the
serial correlation and the cross correlation with the state noise that comes from innovations
in the fundamental, as these are unobservable to agents.
The remaining noise in the price signal ~pt displays both t-step serial correlation and t-step
cross correlation with the process noise, with correlation structures changing over time and
increasing in length. Li et al. (2000) shows how to deal with arbitrary correlation structures
inside a Kalman lter setting, and I follow their approach in my analysis, adapting it to the
present setting. The appropriate Kalman lter recursions are shown in Appendix (6.5). In
Appendix (6.6) I then show that this procedure reduces to the one presented in Section (3)
for 2z = 0.
Because of the endogenous correlation structures, the long-run behavior of this modied
Kalman lter cannot be analysed analytically. I therefore use numerical simulations to
investigate it, and in particular to understand long run weights on public versus private
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information.
First, note that, from (43), the conditional variance of ~pt 1 can be written as
2~pt 1 = 
2
z
Pt 1
j=1
 
 t 1j
2Pt 1
j=1 q
t 1
j;1
2 + 2"

2
^t 1
2
Pt 1
j=1 q
t 1
j;1
2 : (44)
The question then is whether this conditional variance: i) converges to a positive constant, so
that agents keep using both endogenous and exogenous information; ii) converges to zero, so
that agents asymptotically use only information from prices; or iii) diverges, so that agents
asymptotically use only private signals. This depends on the sum of the squares coe¢cients
on the fundamental innovations zi in ~pt.
I thus implement numerically the algorithm presented in Appendix (6.5), for a wide range
of parameterizations for the deep parameters , 2z, 
2
", 
2
v. Numerical simulations show that
in all cases:
1. The sum of coe¢cients on the fundamental innovations in the price signal,
Pt 1
j=1  
t
j
Pt
j=1 q
t
j;1
,
converges over time to a constant. The number of terms increases with t, but their sum
remains always nite and converges to a constant.
2. The Kalman gainKt converges over time to a constant vector: this means that weights
on public and private signals converge to positive constants.
3. The posterior variance of the Kalman lter estimate, 2
^t
, converges also to a constant.
3. Whether the equilibrium weight on the endogenous signal is larger or smaller than that
on the exogenous one depends on the relative values of the structural parameters ; 2z; 
2
"; 
2
v.
In particular, larger , 2" and 
2
z increase the conditional variance of the price signal, as it
can be seen by (44), and thus reduce the Kalman gain on ~pt 1 relative to the one on x
i
t; 
2
v
has instead the opposite e¤ect, as it a¤ects negatively the precision of the exogenous signal.
In equilibrium agents thus use both private exogenous and public endogenous information
with xed weights, as the precision of both signals converges over time to a constant.
Proposition 2 In the setting presented in Section (4), if the information set used by agents
is given by I it = fp
t 1; xi;tg and agents use their information e¢ciently through a Kalman
lter, the precision of agents beliefs about the fundamental converges over time to a positive
constant.
These results show how it is possible for agents to use prices as endogenous signals in
case of a time-varying fundamental, and demonstrate that both endogenous and exogenous
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information are used in equilibrium by agents. The Grossman-Stiglitz paradox thus does not
emerge, even asymptotically, when the fundamental changes over time.
4.1 Alternative information sets
It is instructive to compare the above results with the outcome under alternative information
sets available to agents. In particular, two information sets seem particularly relevant: the
rst is when agents can only observe exogenous signals (because, for example, equilibrium
prices for past periods when trade did not take place were not announced), that is
I it =

xi;t
	
;
and the second is when agents can observe the whole history of prices but only the current
exogenous signal (because, for example, individual agents can take part in only one round,
but past equilibrium prices are announced), that is
I it =

pt 1; xit
	
:
In both cases, the asymptotic behavior of the system can be analysed analytically, as there
are no endogenous correlation structures to be accounted for in the signal extraction problem,
and so it is possible to gain further insights into results from the previous Section.
In the rst case, with I it = fx
i;tg, posterior mean and variances are given by (30)-(32),
with ^
i
t = x
i
t and 
2
^t
=  1t . Prices would then be given by (39):
pt = t  
t 1X
j=1
zj
 
jX
n=1
htn
!
  2
^t
"t:
In terms of the asymptotic variance of the estimation error, this can be found by the
limit behavior of the non-linear di¤erence equation (31), given by its xed point, that is11
lim
t!1
 1t  
 1 =
 2z +
q
(2z)
2 + 42v
2
z
2
: (45)
The gain coe¢cient in the Kalman lter, determining the weighting structure on past signals,
11Only the positive root is meaningful for a variance.
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would also converge to a constant, with
lim
t!1
kxt =
 1 + 2z
 1 + 2z + 
2
v
:
It can thus be seen that the precision of agents estimates about the fundamental would
converge to a constant, as the precision of their cumulative signal remains nite over time.
This is a well known property of the Kalman lter with a time-invariant state-space and
exogenous information.
Remark 1 In the setting presented in Section (4), if the information set used by agents is
given by I it = fx
t;ig and agents use their information e¢ciently through a Kalman lter, the
precision of agents beliefs about the fundamental converges over time to a positive constant.
In the second case, with I it = fp
t 1; xitg, agents would use past prices and current ex-
ogenous information. Assuming that ~pj, j = 1; :::; t   1 is an unbiased signal for j (to be
veried), agents at any time t > 1 could use past price signals to construct an estimate for
t 1, denoted ^
p
t 1 (common for all agents because based only on public information), which
in non-recursive form is given by
^
p
t 1 =
t 1X
j=1
ltj ~pj; (46)
with weights ltj depending on the Kalman gains.
Agents can then take ^
p
t 1 as their prior and use the current observation x
i
t to update
their beliefs for t. The ensuing new posterior mean for each agent i, ^
i
t, would be
^
i
t = ^
p
t 1 +
~kt

xit   ^
p
t 1

;
with ~kt, the Kalman gain at time t, given by
~kt =
2
^
p
t 1
+ 2z
2
^
p
t 1
+ 2z + 
2
v
; (47)
and posterior variance
2
^t
=

1  ~kt

2
^
p
t 1
+ 2z

=
2v

2
^
p
t 1
+ 2z

2
^
p
t 1
+ 2z + 
2
v
; (48)
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with 2
^
p
t 1
given recursively by
2
^
p
t 1
=
2~pt 1

2
^
p
t 2
+ 2z

2
^
p
t 2
+ 2z + 
2
~pt 1
(49)
and representing the variance of the estimate error from ^
p
t 1.
Prices would then be equal to
pt =
Z
^
i
tdi  
2
^t
"t
= ~ktt +

1  ~kt

^
p
t 1   
2
^t
"t: (50)
As the estimate ^
p
t 1, given by (46), is common across agents, each agent can construct the
endogenous signal
~pt 
pt  

1  ~kt

^
p
t 1
~kt
= t   ~k
 1
t 
2
^t
"t; (51)
with conditional variance
2~pt =

~k 1t 
2
^t
2
2": (52)
The price signal ~pt is thus conditionally independent, which conrms the assumption made
before and validates the ltering procedure.12 Note that here, contrary to the case where
past exogenous information is available, the price signal does not include any serial or cross
correlation with the process noise, as all correlations induced by the ltering procedure can
be removed, since they derive from public and common information. It is the use of past
private information that creates additional correlation structures in the public signal, which
cannot be removed by agents and need to be accounted for through a modied Kalman lter.
To understand the asymptotic weights on public and private signals, the conditional
variance of ~pt must be computed. Using (47) and (48) to compute ~k
 1
t 
2
^t
in (51) gives
~k 1t 
2
^t
= 2v (53)
which leads to 2~pt = 
2 (2v)
2
2"  
2
~p, constant.
The variance of the Kalman lter estimate from prices only, 2
^
p
t 1
depends only on its
12If one assumes that agents take part in only one round, at each time t agents would need to reconstruct
the whole history of f~pjg
t 1
j=1
. This can easily be done by computing recursively all past ~kj and ^
p
j 1, j > 1,
using (46) and (47).
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past value, on 2z and on 
2
~p, as shown in (49), and converges over time to a constant.
In terms of the variance of the posterior estimate ^
i
t after the exogenous signal is observed,
its limit behavior is given, using (53), by
lim
t!1
2
^t
= 2v lim
t!1
~kt (54)
where, by (47),
lim
t!1
~kt =
limt!1 
2
^
p
t 1
+ 2z
limt!1 2^pt 1
+ 2z + 
2
v
: (55)
To compute limt!1 
2
^
p
t 1
one needs to nd the limit behavior of the non-linear di¤erence
equation (49), with 2~p = 
2 (2v)
2
2" constant as shown in (52), given by
lim
t!1
2
^
p
t 1
=
 2z +
q
(2z)
2 + 42~p
2
z
2
: (56)
Putting together (54), (55) and (56) leads to a constant asymptotic variance of the Kalman
estimation error
lim
t!1
2
^t
=
2v

 2z +
q
(2z)
2 + 42 (2v)
2 2"
2
z

22v + 
2
z +
q
(2z)
2 + 42 (2v)
2 2"
2
z
:
The asymptotic variance of the estimation error, 2
^t
, thus converges also in this case to a
constant, and so does the Kalman gain ~kt. As the precision of the posterior remains nite,
the conditional variance of prices remains strictly positive and the price signal ~pt from (51)
never becomes fully revealing. Agents continue to use both public endogenous and private
exogenous information to infer the fundamental value over time, with weights converging to
a constant. Again, the precision of their information remains nite over time.
Proposition 3 In the setting presented in Section (4), if the information set used by agents
is given by I it = fp
t 1; xitg and agents use their information e¢ciently through a Kalman
lter, the precision of agents beliefs about the fundamental converges over time to a positive
constant.
Note nally that in the case of a constant fundamental (i.e., 2z = 0), with any of the three
information sets considered prices would become asymptotically fully revealing (though at
di¤erent rates). It was shown in Section (3) for I it = fp
t 1; xi;tg and it is trivial to prove the
result if I it = fx
i;tg, using (9). If instead I it = fp
t 1; xitg, this result can be proved using (62),
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with t = 
 2
v (since only the current exogenous signal is now available): limt!1 !t = 1,
which also implies that limt!1 t = 0.
5 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the ability of prices to convey information about the fundamental
value of an asset in a setting with sequential signals and Bayesian learners.
It has been noted before (see Vives, 1995b) that information accumulation can lead to
a dynamic version of the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox, as asymptotically price signals become
fully revealing and traders stop using private signals. We have seen here that such result
extends to a setting where information accumulates also through private signals, as long as
the fundamental value is constant over time. With a constant fundamental, in fact, as time
goes on and more signals are received, the precision of both private and public cumulative
signals increases without bounds, though at di¤erent rates: the precision of public signals
grows at a faster rate, so agents over time rely more and more on the endogenous rather than
the exogenous information and asymptotically disregard private information altogether.
The fact that asymptotically price signals become fully revealing and traders stop us-
ing private ones does not repropose the problem exposed in the famous Grossman-Stiglitz
paradox because it is an asymptotic outcome with information accumulation: as agents pro-
gressively switch from private to public information, the precision of price signals increases
and they reveal more of the fundamental. In the limit, there is no longer any need to acquire
further information on the constant fundamental through exogenous signals.
With a time-varying fundamental, instead, the role of prices as a source of information
is complicated by the endogenous and time-varying serial and cross correlation structures
that emerge. Nevertheless, I have shown how agents can still use prices as a source of
information, through a modied Kalman lter with arbitrary correlations. As the precision
of the endogenous signal in this case remains nite and converges to a constant, agents
keep using both exogenous and endogenous information over time, with relative weights
converging to a constant.
The central theme of this paper is the relationship between the informational content of
prices and the nature of the underlying fundamental. Only if the fundamental is constant,
Bayesian learning implies an increasing precision of agents beliefs and asymptotically fully
revealing prices. With a changing fundamental, instead, the use of prices as endogenous
signals is complicated by the use of past exogenous information. Correlation structures
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induced by the innovations in the fundamental need to be taken into account in order to
extract information from prices: we have seen how this can be done and shown that prices,
while still being informative, never become fully revealing.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The proof consists in deriving the limiting outcomes of the system as t!1. Using
(7), by the law of large numbers
plim
t!1
xit =  (57)
and from (8)
lim
t!1
t =
t
2v
=1: (58)
That is, by the law of large numbers, the sample mean converges in probability to the mean
of the distribution and its variance goes to zero.
Consider then 2
^t
= 1
t+!t 1
. Since limt!1 t = 1, and by denition !t  0, 8t, it
follows from (15) that
lim
t!1
2
^t
= 0 (59)
and from (19)
lim
t!1
2~pt = 0: (60)
This last result also implies, from (11), that
lim
t!1
!t =1: (61)
Finally, since
!t = !t 1 + 
 2
~pt
= !t 1 + 
2
t
 
22"
 1
=
 
22"
 1 tX
j=1
2j (62)
=
 
22"
 1 tX
j=1

j
2v
2
=
 
2v
 2  
22"
 1
t (t+ 1) (2t+ 1) =6;
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it follows that
t =
t
t + !t 1
=
1
1 + (
2
v)
 2(22")
 1(t 1)t(2t 1)=6
t=2v
=
1
1 + (
2
v
22")
 1(t 1)(2t 1)
6
:
Then clearly,
lim
t!1
t = 0: (63)
Looking then at prices, starting from (16) and noting results (59) and (63)
plim
t!1
pt = plim
t!1
h
t + (1  t) pt 1   
2
^t
"t
i
= plim
t!1
pt: (64)
In order to compute plimt!1 pt, one can make use of a version of the weak law of large
numbers for independent but not identically distributed random variables, which states that
given fXjg a sequence of independent but not identically distributed random variables, if
limt!1
1
t2
V ar[
Pt
j=1Xj] = 0, then, for any " > 0;
lim
t!1
P
 t 1
tX
j=1
Xj   t
 1
tX
j=1
EXj
 < "
!
= 1:
First, I dene X tj = t
 2
~pj
~pj
Pt
n=1 
 2
~pn
: Then pt =
1
t
Pt
j=1X
t
j : Note that Ept = t
 1
Pt
j=1EX
t
j =
t
t
Pt
j=1
E 2
~pj
~pj
Pt
n=1 
 2
~pn
=
Pt
j=1
 2
~pj
Pt
n=1 
 2
~pn
 = : Thus, in order to prove that pt converges in probabil-
ity to , it needs to be shown that t 2V ar[
Pt
j=1X
t
j ]! 0: Note that, sinceX
t
j are independent
over j,
V ar
 
tX
j=1
X tj
!
=
tX
j=1
V ar

X tj

=
tX
j=1
t2 2~pj Pt
n=1 
 2
~pn
2
and thus
t 2
tX
j=1
V ar[X tj ] = t
 2
tX
j=1
t2 2~pi Pt
n=1 
 2
~pn
2 =
Pt
j=1 
 2
~pj Pt
n=1 
 2
~pn
2 = 1Pt
n=1 
 2
~pn
:
Note nally that the denominator in the last expression,
Pt
n=1 
 2
~pn
, is equal to !t, which, as
already established, converges to 1 as t!1. This concludes the proof that
plim
t!1
pt = :
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6.2 Normal priors
An assumption used throughout this paper is that of an uninformative prior for agents at
time 1, before observing any inforation, which simplies some of the analysis and derivation
of key equations. I show here that this assumption is in fact innocuous for results in this
paper.
Using the static setting of Section 3.1, if one assumes that Nature draws from a Normal
distribution with some constant mean  and standard deviation , then agents have an
informative prior to use in their inference. In this case, then
E

 j ; xi; p

=  + xi + (1    ) p;
with
 =
2v
2
p
2v
2
p + 
2

2
v + 
2

2
p
 =
2
2
p
2v
2
p + 
2

2
v + 
2

2
p
:
The new price equation would be
pt =

 + 
 +

 + 
  
2
^
 + 
"t;
with
2
^
= 22 + 
22x + (1    )
22p =
2
2
v
2
p
2v
2
p + 
2

2
v + 
2

2
p
:
The conditional variance of prices would thus be given by
2p =
(2w)
2
( + )2
2"
= 22"

2
2
v
2 + 
2
v
2
:
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Substituting into the previous equation for ,
 =
2v
2
p
2v
2
p + 
2

2
v + 
2

2
p
=
22"
2
 (
2
v)
2
(2 + 
2
v) (
2
 + 
2
v + 
22"
2

2
v)
and for ,
 =
2
2
p
2v
2
p + 
2

2
v + 
2

2
p
=
22" (
2
)
2
2v
(2 + 
2
v) (
2
 + 
2
v + 
22"
2

2
v)
:
One can see that as 2 !1, ! 0 and !
22v
2
"
1+22v
2
"
, thus giving back the framework with
uninformative prior.
The important result here is that, as it was the case with an uninformative prior, as
2v ! 0,  (and now also ) ! 0, so agents rely only on prices in forming beliefs about
the fundamental. As results with sequential signals and information accumulation build on
this feature of the model, by which the precision of public information improves more than
proportionally with the precision of the exogenous one, this shows that such results would
carry out also in the case of an informative prior. The assumption of an uninformative prior
is thus inconsequential for the analysis in this paper.
6.3 Derivation of optimal  with private and public signals
The optimal linear weight on the two signals, , can be obtained by solving the problem
 = argmin

E
 
   E

 j xi; p
2
(65)
with
E

 j xi; p

= xit + (1  ) pt: (66)
Minimizing (65) subject to (66) leads to the rst order condition
E
 
   (xit + (1  ) pt)
  
pt   x
i
t

= 0;
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whose solution implies
 =
Ep2   Epxi
Ep2 + E (xi)2   2Epxi
: (67)
Given that prices and exogenous signals do not covariate (since the noise in the exogenous
signal is averaged out by aggregation), this reduces to
 =
2p
2p + 
2
v
: (68)
6.4 Derivation of the equilibrium price
Combining (21) and (23) gives
2
^
=

2p
2p + 
2
v
2
2v +

2v
2p + 
2
v
2
2p (69)
=
 
2p
2
2v + 
2
p (
2
v)
2 
2v + 
2
p
2 =
 
2v + 
2
p

2p
2
v 
2v + 
2
p
2 = 2p2v2v + 2p = 2v: (70)
Substituting (70) into (24) leads to
p =    2v"
and therefore
2p = 
2
 
2v
2
2":
6.5 Recursive ltering with arbitrary noise
This exposition is taken and adapted from Li et al. (2000). Consider the general system
analysed in Section (4), represented by
t+1 = t + zt
yit = Ht + w
i
t
with H = [1 1]0, yit = [x
i
t ~pt 1]
0 and wit = [v
i
t ~wt], where ~wt  ~pt 1   t. Process and
measurement noise are zero mean but colored, with arbitrary covariance matrices
cov(zn; zj) = Qnj; Qn = Qnn; n; j = 1; 2; :::
cov(wn; wj) = Rnj; Rn = Rnn; n; j = 1; 2; :::
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Moreover, fzg and fwg are arbitrarily correlated with each other, with cross-covariances
cov(zj; wn) = Cj;n, n; j = 1; 2; :::
The initial state is here uncorrelated with state and measurement noise at any time. Follow-
ing Theorem 3 in Li et al. (2000), it is possible to write the recursive lter for this system
as follows:13
1. Initialization: ^
i
1p1 = x
i
1;
2
^1j1
= 2v:
For t > 1:
2. Prediction:
^
i
tpt 1 = ^
i
t 1pt 1 (71)
2
^tjt 1
= 2
^t 1jt 1
+Qt 1 + 2	t 1 (72)
with
	t 1 = 	
t 1
t 1jt 1
and  t 1njj given by the Kalman lter, for n = 2; :::; t  1
	t 1njn 1 = 	
t 1
n 1jn 1 +Qn 1;t 1 (73)
	t 1njn = 	
t 1
njn 1 +Kn

 C 0t 1;n  H	
t 1
njn 1

(74)
with initial value  t 11j1 = 0.
3. Update:
^
i
tpt = ^
i
tpt 1 +Kt
h
yit  H^
i
tpt 1
i
(75)
2
^tjt
= 2
^tjt 1
 KtStK
0
t (76)
13Following usual conventions in the Kalman lter literature, ^
i
tpt 1 represents the prediction based on
information up to time t   1, and ^
i
tpt is the posterior mean after time t information has been included.
Similarly, 2
^tjt 1
is the error variance associated to ^
i
tpt 1 and 
2
^tjt
the error variance associated with ^
i
tpt.
In terms of the notation in the main text, ^
i
t = ^
i
tpt and 
2
^t
= 2
^tjt
:
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with Kt and St given respectively by
Kt =

2
^tjt 1
H 0t + 
t

S 1t (77)
St = H
2
^tjt 1
H 0 +Ht
t + (H
t)
0 +Rt (78)
with

t = 

t
tjt 1
and 
tnjj given recursively by the Kalman lter, for n = 2; :::; t (but the update for 

t
njn
is needed and carried out only up to n = t  1)

tnjn 1 = 

t
n 1jn 1 + Cn 1;t (79)

tnjn = 

t
njn 1 +Kn
 
 Rnt  H

t
njn 1

(80)
with initial value 
t1j1 = 0.
The di¤erences with the standard Kalman lter are given by the terms 	t 1 and 
t, due
to time and cross correlation of state and measurement noises.14 The computation of these
terms requires two nested lters within the main recursion. First, note that Qnj = 
2
z for
n = j and 0 otherwise.
In the context of the present model, the variance covariance matrices required to compute
	t 1 and 
t can be derived as follows. Rewriting (43) as
~pt 1 = t +
t 1X
j=1
t 1j zj + t 1"t (81)
with
t 1j =  
 t 1jPt 1
j=1 q
t 1
j;1
(82)
t 1 =  
2
^t 1Pt 1
j=1 q
t 1
j;1
; (83)
14With 	t 1 = 0 and 
t = 0;8t, this recursion reduces to the standard Kalman lter.
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one can dene all the endogenous serial and cross correlations needed for the recursion. In
particular
Rj;t =
"
jt
2
v 0
0 R(2; 2)jt
#
; j = 2; :::; t
Ct 1;j = cov(zt 1; y
i
j) = [0 0]
0; j = 2; :::; t  1
Cj;t = cov(zj; y
i
t) = [0 
t 1
;j 
2
z]
0; j = 1; :::; t  1;
with
R(2; 2)jt = cov(~pj 1; ~pt 1)
= 2z
j 1X
n=1
j 1n 
t 1
n + jt
 
t 1
2
2";
and jt denoting the Kronecker delta.
Given that Qn<j;j = 0 and Ct 1;j = [0 0]
0;8j, the rst nested Kalman lter recursion
(73)-(74) reduces to
	t 1njn = (1 KnH)	
t 1
n 1jn 1
and given that  t 11j1 = 0, this implies that 	
t 1
t 1jt 1 = 0;8t > 1. This simplication is due
to the fact that in this system there is no serial correlation in the state noise, and no cross
correlation between the current innovation in the state (zt 1) and past measurements up to
yit 1. The key term introduced by the endogeneity of prices and due to the serial correlation
in the noise in ~pt and the cross correlation of such noise with the noise in the state, is thus

t, the computation of which requires the computation of the 
t 1
j and t 1 coe¢cients in
(81), for t > 1.15 Deriving the equivalence between weights and gains in the Kalman lter
15At time t = 1,
p1 = ~p1 = 1   
2
v"1 = 2   z1   
2
v"1
so 11 =  1 and 1 =  
2
v:
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gives
 t1 =
tY
n=2
(1 KnH) ;
 t1<j<t =  
t
j 1 +
tY
n=j+1
(1 KnH)Kj(1; 1)
 tt =  
t
t 1 +Kt(1; 1);
tX
j=1
qtj;1 =   
t
t 1 +Kt (1; 1) :
Using then (82) and (83), one can derive the required covariance matrices Rj;t and Cj;t.
6.6 Kalman lter updating equivalence
I show here that, for 2z = 0, the weight put on new information under the Kalman lter
recursion is the same as the one in the learning algorithm proposed in Section (3).
With 2z = 0, the modied Kalman lter algorithm presented in Appendix (6.5) reduces
to a standard Kalman lter algorithm, as there is no longer any serial correlation in ~pt, nor
any cross correlation between ~pt and the (constant) fundamental. The relevant equations
are thus simplied to
^
i
tpt = ^
i
t 1pt 1 +Kt
h
yit  H^
i
tpt 1
i
2
^tjt
= 2
^t 1jt 1
  2
^tjt 1
H 0t

H2
^tjt 1
H 0 +Rt
 1
2
^tjt 1
Ht
with
Kt = 
2
^t 1jt 1
H 0t

H2
^tjt 1
H 0 +Rt
 1
:
Using the fact that
Rt =
"
2v 0
0 2~pt 1
#
;
it is straightforward to compute the weight put at time t on the new signals xit and ~pt 1,
given by the Kalman gain
Kt =
2664 2~pt 1
2v + 
2
~pt 1
+
2v
2
~pt 1
2
^t 1jt 1
2v
2v + 
2
~pt 1
+
2v
2
~pt 1
2
^t 1jt 1
3775 :
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These are the same weights put on new information under the algorithm proposed in Section
(3). In fact, using (13), (15) and (7)
tx
i
t = t
2
^t
xit = t
2
^t

t 1
t
xit 1 +
 2v
t
xit

so the weight on new private information xit is given by 
2
^t
 2v . Using the fact that
 2
^t
= t + !t 1 = t 1 + 
 2
v + !t 1 + 
 2
~pt 1
=  2
^t 1
+  2v + 
 2
~pt 1
this implies
2
^t
 2v =
 2v
 2
^t 1
+  2v + 
 2
~pt 1
=
2~pt 1
2v
2
~pt 1
2
^t 1
+ 2~pt 1 + 
2
v
;
which is the same weight on private information implied by the Kalman lter. Using the
same steps, it is straightforward to prove the equivalence for the weight put on the price
signal.
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